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Abstract
The chapter describes the recent evolution of the Italian National Health Service 
(NHS), highlighting the potential and effective consequences of the economic and 
financial crisis on social and territorial inequalities, especially in terms of service 
access and quality. First, it analyses the cost-containment and austerity policies 
in the NHS, which brought to a relevant underfunding of the public healthcare 
system, comparing public expenditure trends in Italy with those of other Western 
European countries. Then, it stresses the increasing role played by private expen-
diture, emphasizing the risks in terms of health inequalities connected to the 
high level of out-of-pocket payments and to the spread of the occupational funds. 
Finally, a reconstruction and analysis of the current changes in the NHS governance 
is carried out, explaining in details how the reassertion of the role of the Central 
State in health policy entails different consequences for different areas of Italy, 
widening the territorial inequalities and increasing the North-South divide. So far, 
these changes have taken place without any structural reform, in an imperceptible 
but progressive way, which does not help to develop an appropriate and necessary 
debate on the future of the healthcare system.
Keywords: healthcare, decentralisation, national health service, health inequalities, 
economic crisis
1. Introduction
Since the Italian unification (1861), the Italian healthcare system has fully 
changed its institutional model at least three times. From being substantially 
‘residual’ during the liberal era (1861–1921) and also the fascist decades (1922–
1943), with a gradual spread of corporate health funds and some compulsory 
insurance schemes targeted on specific illnesses [1], it shifted to a social health 
insurance system at the end of the fascism, which was developed after the end 
of the Second World War, during the first 30 years of the Republic (1945–1977); 
finally, an universalist National Health Service (NHS) was instituted in 1978 (Law 
no. 833). Structural changes were then adopted in 1992–1993 (Legislative Decrees 
no. 502/1992 and no. 517/1993), introducing managerialisation and managed 
competition, which was softened in 1999 (Legislative Decree no. 229/1999), while 
Constitutional Law no. 3/2001 recognised, at constitutional level, and strengthened 
the regionalisation of the healthcare system carried out during the 1990s [2].
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As a result, the NHS is structured on three levels: a national level, constituted 
mainly by the Ministry of Health; an intermediate level represented by the Regions 
and their Regional Ministers and health departments and a local operational level, 
directly accountable to the Regional one, made up of about 70–75 Aziende sanitarie 
ospedaliere (hospital trusts, henceforth HTs) and about 135–140 Aziende sanitarie 
locali (local health authorities, henceforth LHAs).
Since 2001, no major reforms have been introduced into the NHS. However, 
important changes have almost imperceptibly taken place, connected the economic 
and financial crisis, which are weakening the universalist nature of the NHS.
This chapter will analyse the evolution of the NHS in Italy during the last 
decade, hence in the years of the crisis, focusing on some trajectories of change 
underway, mainly in the health expenditure and in the NHS institutional frame-
work governance. These trends might have important consequences in terms of 
service access and quality, increasing the traditional social and territorial inequali-
ties and hence weakening the universalistic nature of the NHS.
2. What universalism? NHS performance between North and South
According to international and national literature, the Italian NHS system per-
forms relatively well in comparative terms, among both European and OECD coun-
tries, although it is questionable whether and to what extent some of the results 
reported in the adopted indicators are attributable to the healthcare system in itself. 
The OECD report Health at a Glance [3], which represents a systematic evaluation 
of the healthcare systems in 35 OECD countries, based on 76 indicators gathered in 
9 categories or areas (health status, risk factors, access to care, quality of care and 
health outcomes, health expenditure, staff, care provision, pharmaceuticals, ageing 
and long-term care), the OECD Health profile on Italy [4] and the OECD/EU report 
Health at a Glance: Europe 2018 all agree attributing, by and large, good results in 
terms of prevention, access and quality of care, mortality and survival rates as 
well as in terms of health expenditure and efficiency, with improvements in many 
areas compared with the beginning of the 2000s. However, as emerged not only 
by OECD reports but also by other literature, social inequalities are significant in 
many indicators related to dimensions such as health status, risk factors, access and 
quality of care [3–9].
In particular:
• From 2000 to 2015, life expectancy at birth has increased from 79.9 to 82.7 
years (the second best figure in the EU after Spain), thanks mostly to the 
decrease of the mortality for cardiovascular diseases. However, there are 
relevant gender and social inequalities.
• As far as risk factors are concerned, from 2000 to 2014, the rate of smokers 
has decreased from 25 to 20% slightly below the EU average. Also obesity rates 
decreased, but they remain considerably high, especially among children, with 
18% of children aged 7–8 years in condition of obesity in 2017 (the second 
highest level in Europe, 6 points over the EU average).
• Coverage rates for several types of immunisation are at the level of the 
comparable European countries, although they have slightly decreased after 
2012–2013 (but it is expected to have increased again in most recent years in 
the case of children vaccinations). Conversely, rates of cancer screening have 
increased [6].
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• Avoidable mortality (preventable and amenable) is one of the lowest in 
Europe, and also survival rates for different types of cancer and major cardio-
circulatory illnesses are within the average or among the best found among 
Western European comparable countries.
• In terms of access, the Italian NHS provides coverage to all citizens and foreign 
residents with a comprehensive care based on health needs, but social and 
territorial inequalities are relevant.
• In 2017, health expenditure was below the EU average, both in terms of per 
capita expenditure (2,551 Euro, −8.1% compared with the average EU level) 
and of share of the GDP (8.9, −0.6% compared with EU average). Although 
the NHS ensures a wide package of free services, out-of-pocket expenditure 
(23% of total health expenditure in 2015) is much higher than the EU average 
(15% in 2015).
• Long-term care is still lacking, with several indicators below the level of 
Western European comparable countries, although there are signs of improve-
ments in the last years.
However, as it is well known by NHS scholars, national figures reported in 
international statistics and comparisons hide the very relevant differences existing 
among different areas of countries, traditionally summarised in the North-South 
divide. In this respect, 1992–1993 reforms had introduced the ‘Livelli Essenziali di 
Assistenza’ (essential levels of healthcare), or LEAs, which include all the kinds of 
healthcare services to be provided by all the regions throughout the country. Every 
year Central State attributes to regions the amount of funds needed to the provision 
of this very wide service package, after a State-Regions negotiation based on an 
allocation defined according to per capita criteria, adjusted for the distribution of 
the population by age and epidemiological factors.
The LEAs, which were first released in 2001, are matched with a monitoring and 
control system based on a set of indicators which allow checking whether and to 
what extent regions are respecting and ensuring the LEAs in the healthcare service 
provision to their resident population. The indicators are grouped in three areas of 
healthcare (prevention; outpatient, community and home care; hospital care). For 
each area, a synthetic index is obtained from the relevant indicators, with scores 
which may vary between 0.00 and 100.0 points. The monitoring system is associ-
ated to incentives and sanctions in terms of attributed funds.
Last assessment carried out by the Ministry of Health in 2017 [10] showed the 
persistence of very relevant disparities among Regions, with Northern Regions 
nearly always having the best scores in most of the indicators of the three areas of 
healthcare. Moreover, differences in the scores are striking, going, in prevention, 
from 80.92/100.00 points by Lombardy to 48.48 by Sicily; in outpatient care, 
from 86.39/100.00 by Liguria to 29.05 by Campania and in hospital care, from 
89.13/100.00 points by Tuscany to 25.41/100.00 points obtained by Campania. 
Although many indicators are focused on expenditure efficiency, they highlight 
also the very important territorial differences existing in terms of service access and 
quality, in favour of Northern and Centre-Northern Regions.
These differences are historically rooted. However, despite significant efforts 
especially addressed to reduce territorial differences in expenditure for health 
services [11], these were not translated into a correspondent reduction of the dif-
ferences existing in terms of service quality and efficiency between different areas 
of the country. Quite the opposite, according to some studies, the North-South 
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gap has been widened since the 1990s, that is, in the years of NHS regionalisation, 
instead of being reduced [12–14].
In this context, the economic crisis started in 2008–2009 triggered a set of poli-
cies which, on the one hand, risk to deepen the existing social inequalities in terms 
of service access; on the other hand, they caused a substantial change in the NHS 
governance which could seriously increase the territorial differences.
3. The economic crisis and austerity policies in the NHS
In Italy, the economic crisis started in 2008 was prolonged, with a fluctuating 
trend, characterised by two peaks (Table 1): the first was in 2008 and especially in 
2009, when the Italian GDP declined by 1.1 and 5.5%, respectively, from the previ-
ous year. After an overall weak recovery in the following 2 years, in 2012, the crisis 
heightened and the GDP dropped by 2.8%, followed by a further decline of 1.7% in 
2013. In 2014–2015, the GDP growth trend was very slack and became a little more 
sustained in 2016–2017 (respectively, 1.1 and 1.6%), but in 2018, it dropped down 
again below 1%, and also provisional data for 2019 indicate a further weakening of 
the economic recovery (Eurostat database). In all these years, the GDP growth rates 
were considerably lower than those of the 28 EU countries (Table 1). Similar differ-
ences emerge also considering only the countries within the Euro area.
The recession had a very strong impact on the relationship between the GDP and 
public debt. Since 1991–1992, this ratio had always been at more than 100%, one 
of the highest in Europe, except for 2007 (99.8%). However, since the start of the 
economic crisis, it has progressively increased surpassing the 130% of the GDP in 
2014, with a tendency to level off over this level (Table 2).
Beyond the data, the crisis became particularly serious in 2011–2012, when the 
widespread perception, by the international markets and European institutions, 
that the Italian government was no longer able to bring the debt under control 
resulted in a sovereign debt crisis. This brought to the fall of the Berlusconi gov-
ernment, at the end of 2011, replaced by a ‘technical’ executive, headed by the 
economist Mario Monti. In the context of a protracted financial crisis and lack 
of confidence of the international environment, strict austerity measures were 
taken to control the budget deficit, reduce public sector expenses and increase 
public revenues [15]. While in policy areas such as pensions, these measures were 
accompanied by structural reforms; this was not the case in healthcare which was, 
however, object of severe cost-containment and retrenchment measures.
In the Italian highly regionalised NHS, control of health expenditure by the 
central government was pursued primarily through extremely limited increases, 
and, in some cases, reductions in the level of funding are attributed by the central 
government to the regions to finance the LEAs. The level of annual funding of LEAs 
is calculated in the budget laws, called ‘stability laws’, and it is negotiated between 
the State and the Regions within the State-Region Conference (see below) and 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Italy 1.5 −1.1 −5.5 1.7 0.6 −2.8 −1.7 0.1 0.9 1.1 1.6 0.9
Eu 
28
3.1 0.5 -4.3 2.1 1.8 −0.4 0.3 1.8 2.3 2 2.4 2.0
Source: Eurostat: National accounts and GDP online database.
Table 1. 
GDP rates: percentage change on previous year.
5Economic Crisis, Decentralisation and Health Inequalities: The Case of Italy
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89006
ratified in official acts and documents such as the ‘State-Region Agreements’ or the 
‘Pacts for Health’. However, the Parliament and the central government can modify 
the concerted funding levels, as has always occurred in fact, after the beginning of 
the crisis with reductions in the originally agreed funds.
Absolute values and percentages of annual funding increases confirmed a stag-
nation in the central government financing from 2010 onwards, with very reduced 
surges but also drops compared with the previous years, in 2013 and in 2015 
(Table 3). From 2010 to 2019, central funding increased by about 8,800,000,000 
Euro, with a yearly average of about 0.9%, less than the average yearly inflation rate 
(about 1.1%; see [16, 17]).
Besides the containment of general central funding, austerity policies addressed 
the control of specific sources of expenditure arising from the acquisition of 
production inputs. The main cost-containment programmes started in 2009 (Law 
Decree No. 39/2009) and 2010 (Law Decree No. 78/2010) and intensified in the 
following years, culminating in the so-called spending review on public admin-
istration, promoted by the Monti government in 2012 (Law Decree No. 95/2012, 
converted into Law No. 131/2012). The austerity measures then continued roughly 
until at least 2016, albeit with less intensity, and the cost-containment in healthcare 
remains one of the central government priorities.
Main policies included spending caps and reduction in the pharmaceutical 
expenditure; decrease in hospitalisation rates and in the number of hospital beds per 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
99.8 102.4 112.5 115.4 116.5 123.4 129 131.8 131.6 131.4 131.2 131.4
Source: Eurostat: General government gross debt online database.
Table 2. 
General government gross debt in Italy: percentage of GDP.
Financing (in Euro)* Change compared with 
previous year (in Euro)*
Change compared with 
previous year (%)
2007 97,600,000,000 (4,400,000,000) (4.7)
2008 101,600,000,000 4,000,000,000 4.1
2009 104,200,000,000 2,600,000,000 2.6
2010 105,600,000,000 1,400,000,000 1.3
2011 106,900,000,000 1,300,000,000 1.2
2012 108,000,000,000 1,100,000,000 1.0
2013 107,000,000,000 −1,000,000,000 0.9
2014 109,900,000,000 2,700,000,000 2.7
2015 109,700,000,000 −200,000,000 −0.2
2016 111,000,000,000 1,300,000,000 1.2
2017 112,600,000,000 1,600,000,000 1.4
2018 113,400,000,000 800,000,000 0.7
2019 114,400,000,000 1,000,000,000 0.9
*Approximate.
Source: Ministero della Salute [16].
Table 3. 
Financing of the central funding for LEAs.
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1000 inhabitants; a redefinition, in a generally restrictive sense, of the criteria used 
to set the regional tariffs (linked to DRG-like systems), for inpatient and outpatient 
services provided to the NHS; general restrictions of the expenditure on purchases 
of goods and services; increasing revenues, mainly by increasing the copayments for 
citizens, although Regions have the possibility to make partially different choices.
These measures were added to those aimed at controlling staff expenditure in 
all public services [15], which are of particular significance due to the importance 
of human resources in the health sector. In the NHS there were main two types of 
measures addressed to public providers: measures aimed at gradually reducing the 
number of employees and others at containing wage and salaries.
In the first case, at the end of 2006, and thus before the start of the crisis, a cap 
for personnel expenditure in the NHS, which had to be equal to the ‘corresponding 
amount of the year 2004 reduced by 1.4%’, including costs for temporary employees 
and autonomous workers. This measure has been substantially confirmed, with some 
minor changes, until May 2019, when it was replaced by less restrictive constraints.
A predictable result of the cap and other similar measures was a slowdown 
and substantial stop in the staff hiring and turnover within the NHS healthcare 
organisations. Between 2008 and 2017, the staff of the NHS passed from 689,873 
to 647,048 total employees, a drop of 42,825 employees (−6.2%; data taken from 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance online database). The decrease was highly 
significant, considering that the Italian healthcare service is understaffed compared 
with many European countries [1].
Staff hiring was reopened in 2017–2018; especially after that the new national 
NHS collective agreement signed in 2018 opened the possibility to hold extraordi-
nary public competitions for the new recruitment of doctors, nurses and technical 
health personnel. These measures were confirmed by the stability law for 2019. 
However, the pace of recruitment seems inadequate to face the lack of healthcare 
staff within the NHS, which will become more serious in the next years considering 
the predictable wave of retirements connected to an ageing labour force, especially 
among doctors [18].
Furthermore, a second type of measures concerned the containment of wages 
for employees in the NHS, as well as independent professionals working for the 
NHS, starting from the general practitioners and paediatricians. After moderate 
wage increases in 2008–2009, national-level collective bargaining was suspended 
for 2 years, in 2010, for all 2,800,000 contractualised public employees, including 
NHS staff. The suspension was then extended until 2015, when a sentence of the 
Constitutional Court forced the government to restart the collective bargaining 
process in the public sector. A new national NHS collective agreement for the 
period of 2016–2018 was signed in May 2018, with modest pay increases. Collective 
negotiations at decentralised level was not frozen but was put under strict financial 
constraints, with the prohibition to exceed the amount of resources used in 2010. 
The overall effect of these provisions was to freeze the salaries of NHS employees 
for 8 years, substantially to the levels of 2010.
In addition to these measures, there were also specific measures addressing the 
Regions in conditions of high deficit in the health sector and therefore subjected to a 
recovery plan, which will be dealt in the second part of the article.
4.  Dynamics of public and private expenditure: out-of-pocket payments 
and occupational funds
The overall effect of the austerity policies and public underfinancing policies 
has been a recalibration in the health expenditure levels, which were already lower 
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than the average values recorded in comparable continental and Northern European 
countries, and in line with the other countries of Southern Europe (in particular 
Spain and Portugal). In Italy, in 2015–2016, the total health expenditure in fact 
amounted to 8.9–9% of the GDP (+0.7–0.8% compared with 2007), two points 
(or more) below than in France, Germany and Sweden, which traditionally have 
expenditures higher than Italy, and also nearly a point less than in the UK, which 
has always been a very parsimonious country. In 2017–2018, the total health expen-
diture amounted to 8.8% of the GDP (OECD database).
Also public (or government) health expenditure is lower than in the main conti-
nental and Northern European countries, in terms of both the share of the GDP and 
per capita expenditure (Table 3). Starting from a precrisis value of 6.3% (2007), 
the Italian government expenditure, GDP ratio did not grow even by half a percent 
in the following decade (6.6% in 2017 and 6.5% in 2018 estimation), despite the 
inevitable increase in demand for services with a steadily ageing population, which 
has the highest share of the over 60 age bracket in Europe (22.3% in 2017) and the 
highest median age in Europe along with Germany (45.9 in 2017, Eurostat database). 
Similarly, public expenditure per capita on health services increased by 18% from 
2007 to 2018, a share much lower than in the main continental and Northern Europe 
countries reported in Table 4.
Italian trends in public expenditure on health are more similar to those of other 
Mediterranean European countries such as Portugal and Spain, although, from 2007 
to 2016, the growth of expenditure per capita in Spain was certainly higher (23.3%).
At the same time, the share of private health expenditure over the total expendi-
ture on health, while diminishing in France, Germany and Sweden, increased in the 
UK, Italy and other Southern European countries (Table 5). In Italy, from 2007 to 
2018, it shifted from 22.5 to 25.8% of the total health expenditure, therefore coming 
to represent more than a quarter of total health expenditure. This brought the level 
of private health expenditure closer to that of Spain. Highest ratios of private health 
expenditures, which should not be typical of NHS systems, are shared by other 
Mediterranean countries such as Portugal and Spain (and, of course, Greece where 
private health expenditures represent nearly 40% of total health expenditure).
The increase in private health expenditure, traditionally high, entails serious risks 
of worsening in social inequalities, in an era of economic crisis, especially because in 
Italy it is mainly constituted by out-of-pocket payments which, as it is well-known, 
emphasise the role of socioeconomic inequalities in service access. Between 2007 
Share of GDP (%) Per capita (US$PPP) Growth of expenditure 
per capita (%)
2000 2007 2018p 2000 2007 2018p 2007-2018p
France 7.6 8.0 9.3 2119 2770 4141 33.1
Germany 7.7 7.5 9.5 2260 2809 5056 44.4
Sweden 6.3 6.6 9.3 1878 2647 4570 42.1
UK 4.7 6.1 7.5 1238 2111 3139 32.7
Italy 5.5 6.3 6.5 1474 2088 2545 18.0
Portugal 5.9 6.2 6.0 1127 1548 1902 18.6
Spain 4.9 5.7 6.2 1087 1795 2341 23.3
p = provisional value. Source: OECD Health Care online database.
Table 4. 
Levels of current public expenditure on healthcare.
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and 2014, the share of individuals reported unmet needs for medical examinations 
(because they were too expensive, because care facilities were too far away or because 
of waiting lists) for medical examinations shifted from 4.1 to 7.0%, highly concen-
trated in the share of population with the lowest income (elaborations by E. Pavolini 
on OECD health care online database). It is quite likely that the combination between 
cost-containment and retrenchment policies in the public sector and the increase in 
the role of private expenditure played an important role in determining this result.
However, an important part of the growth of private health expenditure in 
Italy during the crisis was due to the insurance component. In this regard, one of 
the most recent transformations that has taken place in Italy in relation to private 
health expenditure is the spread of occupational health funds for workers and their 
families, introduced or reintroduced from national collective bargaining or unilat-
eral initiatives by employers (Table 6).
Although the occupational funds were almost non-existent in the 1990s, they 
have increased dramatically in the past decade, especially since the mid-2000s, 
reaching more than 10,000,000 people, around 33–35% of the total employees, in 
2017. Most of the workers registered to an occupational scheme are employees (63% 
of total registered people), which mostly belong to the private sector, given that 
occupational schemes in healthcare are still nearly absent in the public sector.
The increased role of occupational healthcare funds represents a major chal-
lenge to the universalistic nature of the Italian NHS for three main reasons [19]: (a) 
they are increasingly financing core healthcare provision (especially diagnostics 
Categories No. of registered people to occupational schemes %
Employees 6,692,000 63.0
Independent workers 1,062,239 10.0
Employee relatives 1,944,634 18.3
Independent workers relatives 216,070 2.0
Pensioners and relatives 500,966 4.7
Pensioner relatives 200,386 1.9
Total 10,616,847 100.0
Source: GIMBE [17], elaborated from data by the Ministry of Health.
Table 6. 
Registered people to occupational schemes: 2017.
2007 2018p Diff 2018p-2007
France 22.9 (9.5) 16.6 (9.4pp) −6.3 (−0.1pp)
Germany 24.9 (14.3) 15.5 (12.3) −9.4 (−2.0)
Sweden 18.1 (16.9) 16.1 (14.8) −2.0 (-2.1)
UK 18.3 (10.4) 20.5 (16.0pp) 2.2 (5.6pp)
Italy 22.5 (21.5) 25.8 (23.1) 3.3 (1.8)
Portugal 31.3 (25.7) 33.5 (27.4pp) 2.2 (1.9pp)
Spain 27.3 (21.0) 29.5 (23.6pp) 2.2 (2.6pp)
p = provisional value; pp = data referred to 2017. Source: OECD Health Care online database.
Table 5. 
Private and out-of-pocket health expenditure in share of total health expenditure (%) (in brackets: out- 
of-pocket health expenditure as % of total health expenditure).
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and ambulatory care), which should be offered by the NHS, acting as a substitute 
for NHS services rather than completing or supplementing them; (b) access to 
occupational healthcare funds is profoundly affected by the employees’ occupa-
tion and their position in the labour market (fixed-term vs. open-ended contracts, 
manual occupations vs. nonmanual occupations, unskilled occupations vs. skilled 
professions, etc.), and coverage is therefore rather unevenly distributed among 
workers and also in relation to the sector of employment; and (c) occupational 
schemes are concentrated among workers employed in big and medium-sized 
firms; this entails the creation of inequalities among those employed in firms of dif-
ferent sizes. Moreover, as medium and big firms are mainly located in the North of 
Italy, the spread of occupational funds brings serious risk to deepen the traditional 
differences existing in service access and quality between the North and the South 
of the country.
5.  The evolution of the governance of the NHS between the reassertion 
of the role of the State and the development of a differentiated 
regionalism
Unlike the oldest national health services, such as those of England or Sweden, 
the Italian NHS has always had a decentralised structure, in line with the Italian 
Constitution. In a first phase (1978–1992), the powers and responsibilities were 
divided among the State, Regions and local government. With the reforms of 1992–
1993 (Legislative Decrees No. 502/1992 and No. 517/1993), instead, the region-
alisation of the NHS was introduced, together with its managerialisation [5, 20]. 
Regionalisation was then strengthened by the Constitutional reform introduced 
in 2001 and confirmed by the failures of subsequent attempts of Constitutional 
reforms in 2006 and 2016.
According to current regulation, legislative powers are shared between Central 
State and Regions. As already mentioned, the State is in charge of defining the 
‘essential levels of healthcare’, or LEAs, and has to guarantee regions the finan-
cial resources necessary for LEA provision. Regions and the two Autonomous 
Provinces of Trento and Bolzano have great freedom in organisation and man-
agement of their Regional Health Services. Starting from the second half of the 
1990s, different ‘regional healthcare models’ emerged, characterised by regula-
tory structures marked by hierarchical integration, cooperation or competition 
between purchasers and service providers [2]. NHS regionalisation includes also 
a certain degree of fiscal autonomy, even if very restricted (see [21]), as well as 
the possibility of introducing copayments for drugs and outpatient services at 
regional level.
The balance of powers between state and regions that emerged from the region-
alisation introduced during the 1990s and in 2001 required a permanent mechanism 
of negotiation and, possibly, cooperation between the State and the Regions to 
define national health policy.
On the one hand, since 2001 the central government has been de facto unable 
to implement institutional and organisational reforms without the consent and 
the involvement of regions. On the other hand, regions must respect a national 
regulative framework which imposes significant constraints on their possibility to 
introduce institutional changes within the regional healthcare systems. Therefore, 
concerted policy-making has been developing since 2000–2001. It has given rise to 
a series of ‘agreements’, ‘pacts’ or ‘ententes’ signed in the ‘State, Regions and Local 
Governments Conference’ (simply called State-Regions Conference) and then 
converted into legislation by the Parliament.
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The State-Regions Conference includes the Prime Minister as President of the 
Conference, the Presidents (or Governors) of the Regions or other Ministers when-
ever matters related to areas of their competence are discussed. Instituted in 1988 
and strengthened in 1997, in the first part of the 2000s, the Conference came to play 
a major role in national healthcare policy-making, representing the main institu-
tional mechanism able to ensure close cooperation among Regions and permanent 
negotiation between those and the central government (see [22] for more details).
Although none of the regulatory changes had modified the above-described 
division of powers, the economic and financial crisis as well as political responses 
to the crisis weakened the role of the regions in national policy-making, in favour 
of greater importance of the role played by the central government, the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance (MEF) and, indirectly, by the European institutions. 
State-Region Conference has partially lost its centrality in policy-making, given that 
concerted policy-making has been increasingly substituted by unilateral decision-
making by central government and supra-national institutions.
This shift became particularly evident after the explosion of the sovereign debt 
crisis of 2011–2012. The need to take urgent measures able to signal to international 
markets and the EU the willingness and ability of the national Government to bring 
the public debt under control have prompted approval of measures, contained in 
the laws of stability and austerity packages adopted by the Central Government, 
which in great part had not been agreed upon and basically not even discussed with 
the regions, Parliament and organised interests. The minimisation of room for 
discussion and negotiation was motivated by the lack of time and alternatives in the 
face of the commitments made with the EU and the need to reassure the markets. 
These dynamics did not occur only in Italy but were common to all the European 
countries most affected by the financial crisis and sovereign debt, namely, those of 
Southern Europe and, in a partially different form, Ireland [23–26].
The reassertion of the role of the State was enhanced by the economic crisis, but 
it had already started before 2007–2008. In the mid-2000s, many Regions showed 
to be unable to control health expenditure growth and contain regional deficits. 
In order to ensure compliance with the European Stability and Growth Pact, in 
2005, the central government and Regions agreed on a multistep mechanism 
of regional expenditure monitoring and recovery plans in the case of excessive 
deficits. If a Region accumulates serious deficits and misses spending targets, the 
agreement provides for the activation of automatic mechanisms (like an increase 
in regional taxes) and the close supervision of regional expenditure policies by the 
MEF. Central government may appoint a commissioner in charge of NHS admin-
istration in that Region and impose specific measures to reduce deficits, thereby 
introducing severe limitations on regional autonomy.
To date, the recovery plan mechanism has been activated in 10 (out of 20) 
regions, and 5 of them have been subjected to administration by a commissioner. In 
2019, seven regions are subject to a recovery plan; most of them entered the mecha-
nism between 2007 and 2010. These regions include all Southern and Southern-
Central Regions except the small Basilicata, while only two Northern Regions were 
forced to approve a recovery plan and were never commissioned.
Despite differences between individual cases, the recovery plan mechanism was 
largely effective in securing a debt reduction of the regions. The success was such as 
to cause the Government to introduce a control mechanism of deficits of individual 
NHS providers, bound to the presentation of plans, in 2015.
However, experience has shown that, once the plan procedures began, it was 
extremely difficult to abandon them. This was due not only to the presence of partic-
ularly demanding financial targets in years of economic crisis but also to the existence 
of objectives beyond purely economic aspects that impacted on quality and access 
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to services. In many cases these objectives were not easy to meet, considering that 
recovery plans inevitably required retrenchment policies which entailed severe cuts 
and other kind of restrictions in service provision. On this respect, this monitoring 
mechanism might have determined a worsening in some dimensions linked to access 
and service quality, widening the gap between Southern Regions which entered into 
the recovery plans and Northern Regions free from the plans and their constraints.
From the point of view of the intergovernmental relations, the recovery plan 
mechanism severely restricted the autonomy of regional governments in the devel-
opment of health policies. Central government and, in particular, the MEF not only 
exerted a penetrating supervision and monitoring of the plan implementations in 
the regions concerned but also, often, gained the right to exert a sort of veto, in the 
face of regional policies that involve increased expenditure. Although the formal 
division of powers between the levels of government has not changed over the past 
decade, regional decentralisation proved in fact to be much weakened in favour of 
an increase of the Central State’s regulatory role, embodied by MEF rather than by 
the Ministry of Health [27, 28].
If Central and Southern-Central healthcare have been subjected to these strict 
forms of control during the years of crisis and until now, this has not been the case 
of the Northern and Central-Northern regions, except for two cases (Piedmont 
and Liguria). In most of these regions, the ability to maintain fiscal equilibrium 
or limited deficit has allowed them to consolidate the autonomy of regional health 
policies, even in the presence of nationally determined austerity policies.
Moreover, some of these regions (Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy and Veneto) have 
formally demanded ‘further forms and conditions of autonomy’ (Article 116, cl. 3, 
Italian Constitution), both in the health sector and in other policy sectors, which 
would make them more similar to the five Italian regions provided, from the 1950s, 
with a special autonomy for historical or ethnical reasons.
After the successful consultative referendum held in Lombardy and Veneto on 
22–23 October 2017, and the formal request of the Emilia-Romagna government 
between August and October 2017, a negotiating table was opened with the central 
government, according to the procedure laid down in Art. 116 of the Constitution. 
Although negotiations are still underway, with serious conflicts emerged between 
the two parties of the current coalition government, it is quite clear that the request 
of more autonomy should concern not only the management of resources but 
also regional tax capacity, so as to take a significant step towards a more complete 
accountability of the regions. One of the most delicate issue concerns the possibility 
to retain most of fiscal revenues collected within any single region, limiting the pro-
cess of central redistribution. Given the very relevant differences in fiscal capacity 
between the North and the South of Italy, the potential effects of this change could 
be highly detrimental for Southern Regions.
6. Conclusions
Economic and financial crises which severely hit Italy did not result into struc-
tural and fundamental changes in the NHS. However, it prompted or accelerated 
some processes which seriously risk to gradually change a universalist healthcare 
system into a more hybrid one. Retrenchment and austerity policies in the public, 
underfinanced NHS find some sort of compensation in the high level of private 
out-of-pocket expenditure and in the spread of occupational funds. As a con-
sequence, traditional inequalities in access to healthcare services are deepening 
and seem bound to increase, exacerbating differences among socioeconomic and 
occupational groups.
Universal Health Coverage
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Moreover, the trend to informal but substantial re-centralisation in national 
policy-making, with the reassertion of the role of the state in charge of playing the 
role of ‘financial watchdog’ of regional governments, is having different conse-
quences for Northern and Southern Regions. The former was able to retain their 
autonomy, so that to develop health policies targeted to the needs of their citizens, 
while the ladder entered into a monitoring mechanism of their expenditure, which 
is giving significant results in financial terms but risk to worsen service access and 
quality.
So far, healthcare system ‘hybridisation’ [29] and the trend to ‘differentiated 
federalism’ [28] or ‘differentiated autonomy’ have occurred without any structural 
reforms, by means of imperceptible but progressive changes which, in terms of 
institutional change, may be qualified in terms of ‘gradual transformation’ [30, 31]. 
However, the formal request for constitutional change by three regions and related, 
current political conflicts, as well as the increasing complaints and also protests by 
doctors and healthcare experts on NHS underfinancing, emphasised by the media, 
might help promote an open debate on the future of the Italian NHS and health 
policy, which has been completely lacking so far.
© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
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